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21. Introduction
Theoretical papers suggest that large shareholders have a dual impact on firms. On the one
hand, significant owners have a strong incentive to monitor management to ensure that a firm’s
value is maximized, while on the other hand, their behaviour is motivated by the possibility
to extract rents and enjoy the private benefits of control.1 Hence, as argued in Shleifer and
Vishny (1997), the overall effect of large shareholders on firms is ambiguous and has to be
tested empirically.
In this paper we provide evidence that large shareholders extract rents from firms and
expropriate minority shareholders, by showing that some corporate ownership patterns are
consistently associated with higher/lower target dividend payout ratios and different levels
of dividend smoothing in the cross-section. Moreover, by comparing dividends paid across
various ownership structures we quantify the rent extraction associated with the presence of
large shareholders and show that it is substantial. We consider several levels of ownership
concentration, several types of the single largest owner, and investigate the difference between
domestic and foreign owners.
We find that presence of a significant minority shareholder prevents majority owners from
extracting rent by increasing the target payout ratio. This finding is much stronger for domestic
owners than for foreigners. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that strong minority
owners play a crucial role in dividend policy, especially in the weak corporate governance
environment of an emerging economy.
We use data from the Czech Republic for the period 1996-2003. This dataset allows us, first,
to account for the endogeneity of ownership and, second, to separate the effect of ownership
from a broader institutional corporate governance framework. The unique modern economic
history of the Czech Republic helps to explain the ownership endogeneity problem, as the
initial ownership structure of companies was set exogenously by government bureaucrats during
privatization in 1991-1994. The dataset we use in this study includes detailed variables from the
privatization process as well as variables capturing pre-market firm-level conditions, which we
employ as instruments for ownership. After privatization, ownership rights were fully honoured
1 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) were the first to formally investigate the role of large investors in firms, and
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a systematic survey of costs and benefits associated with the presence of
large shareholders in firms. More recently, Bolton and von Thadden (1998) model the trade-off between costs
and benefits of concentrated versus dispersed ownership and Burkart et al. (2000) show how large shareholders
and the private benefits they enjoy influence takeovers.
3which helped early corporate development,2 but the evolution of institutional structures was
considerably slower; corporate governance was virtually nonexistent, and corporate law was
only weakly enforced. As a result, corporate governance mechanisms which are present in
developed economies and which play a key role in the relationship between corporate insiders
and outsiders, including dividend policy, were missing.3 These conditions forced shareholders
to act based on fundamental rights derived from ownership only, and hence the environment
of the Czech Republic fits closely our model’s assumptions of large shareholders’ behaviour. In
this way, privatization and the fact that corporate law and governance developed from scratch
in the Czech Republic help focus our analysis on the effect of ownership only.
This paper is the first empirical study of dividends from a transition country in Central
and Eastern Europe. Since many CEE countries underwent a similarly quick transition from a
state-directed to a market economy, our findings based on data from the Czech Republic may
to a large extent be valid for them as well.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In the next section we survey the literature; in section
3 we provide an institutional outline and explain in detail how private ownership developed
in the Czech Republic over the 1990s; in section 4 we define ownership variables, describe our
model, and present our econometric technique; section 5 contains a description of our data
and summary statistics; in section 6 we present our results; section 7 contains some robustness
checks; section 8 summarizes the paper and concludes.
2. Literature
The existing empirical evidence on rent extraction by large shareholders deals with developed
economies only and gives mixed results. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) show that private benefits
2 Using data from transition countries Johnson et al. (2002) find that property rights are the most important
determinant of investment by entrepreneurs. Weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits,
even when bank loans are available.
3 In their international study Laporta et al. (2000) offer evidence that countries with laws protecting the
rights of minority shareholders are associated with higher dividend payout ratios and show that companies pay
out a smaller proportion of earnings in those countries where laws are more relaxed about overinvestment and
empire building. Other economic institutions are important determinants of dividend policy as well. Dewenter
and Warther (1998) compare dividend policies of U.S. and Japanese corporations and link them to institutional
differences in the structure of corporate ownership. Japanese firms face fewer agency conflicts and information
asymmetries than do U.S. firms. Consistent with the agency theory of dividends, Japanese firms experience
smaller stock price reactions to dividend omissions and initiations, they are less reluctant to omit and cut
dividends, and their dividends are more responsive to earnings changes.
4of control affect ownership structure in the U.S. and Zingales (1994) argues that expropriation
by large shareholders is significant in Italy. On the contrary, Bergstro¨m and Rydqvist (1990)
and Barclay and Holderness (1989, 1992) do not find evidence of substantial expropriation in
Sweden or the United States, respectively. In the paper closest to our own, Gugler and Yurtoglu
(2003) suggest that this problem is present in Germany. The authors show that announcements
in dividend change provide new information about conflicts between a controlling owner and
small outside shareholders in Germany, and document how small shareholders use dividends
to limit rent extraction by controlling owners.4 Faccio et al. (2001) find evidence of systematic
expropriation of the outside shareholders in Western Europe and East Asia at the base of
extensive corporate pyramids. They show that corporations in Europe pay significantly higher
dividends than in Asia and that in Europe other large shareholders contain the controlling
shareholder’s expropriation of minority shareholders whereas in Asia they collude in that
expropriation.
Our paper is novel since by working in the Czech transition environment we can fully account
for ownership endogeneity and focus on fundamental rights derived from ownership. We also
benefit from a large sample that covers a majority of the country’s economic activity.
Our work is also linked to a rich empirical literature on corporate dividend policy. According
to free cash flow theory5 dividends are a control mechanism used by shareholders to divert free
funds, which managers have power over within corporations, away from them. The sharehold-
ers’ goal is to prevent managers from perk consumption, empire building/overinvestment, or
management entrenchment6. In support of the free cash flow theory Lang and Litzenberger
(1989) find that the market reacts favourably to dividend announcements made by firms with
characteristics suggesting that they might otherwise overinvest their funds. Brook et al. (1998)
show that firms poised to experience large, permanent cash flow increases after four years of
flat cash flow tend to boost their dividends before cash flow jumps, but are hesitant to adjust
them afterwards.
4 Similarly, Gugler (2003) estimates the effect of ownership on dividend policy using data from Austria. He
finds that ownership and control structure of a firm are significant determinants of its dividend policy.
5 First mentioned by Easterbrook (1984), reinvented by Jensen (1986), and modelled in a dynamic setting in
Zwiebel (1996).
6 Shleifer and Vishny (1989) model management entrenchment as one possible driving force behind inefficient
investments undertaken by managers with free cash flows at hand.
5The competing argument to free cash flow is based on the idea that management uses
dividend policy to communicate to investors the level and growth of income or future prospects
of the company because ordinary accounting reports are insufficient or inadequate to convey
this information.7 In their test of signalling hypothesis versus other agency models Bernheim
and Wantz (1995) find support for signalling theory. Similarly, Offer and Siegel (1987) show
that equity analysts revise their earnings forecasts following the announcement of an unex-
pected dividend change. Also, in their event study of stock price reactions to dividend change
announcements Amihud and Murgia (1997) find some dividend-signalling patterns in Germany.
On the other hand, DeAngelo et al. (1996) argue that dividend changes lag behind earnings
changes and conclude that managers do not signal their negative information with dividends.
An even stronger argument appears in a study by Benartzi et al. (1997). They find no evidence
that changes in dividends carry information about future earnings changes.
Both signalling and free cash flow theory were developed for firms with dispersed ownership
structures and hence with managerial control. Similar to other continental European countries,
the ownership of Czech firms is rather concentrated in the period we analyse.8 For a firm with
concentrated ownership, the free cash flow and signalling rationale for paying dividends still
applies but, in this case, dividends are used to solve the agency issues and/or the asymmetry
of information between a dominant shareholder who colludes with management (appoints the
management) and remaining shareholders. Therefore, corporate dividend policy in a firm with
concentrated ownership is predominantly determined by how the conflict among the firm’s
shareholders about distribution of profits (benefits) is resolved. Legally, all shareholders have
the same cash flow rights in the Czech Republic. Paying dividends follows this principle as
cash reaches all shareholders proportionally, but a dominant shareholder exerting effort to seek
private benefits associated with ownership does not. In other words, in contrast to the case
of dispersed ownership where the main corporate governance issue is to solve moral hazard
between management and shareholders, good governance in concentrated ownership structures
predominantly means equal treatment (per unit of stake in the firm) of all shareholders. From
7 This literature was started by Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985), and was extended by John
and Williams (1985) and Bernheim (1991).
8 High ownership concentration is present in most Continental European countries. See La Porta et al. (1999)
for a description of prevailing ownership structures in Europe. Additional relevant descriptions are in Gugler
(2003) for Austria, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) for Germany, and Kocˇenda (1999) for the Czech Republic.
6the minority shareholders point of view, dividend payments alleviate the free cash flow problem
or serve as a signal.
3. Institutional Environment
3.1. Privatization
Since the ownership structure of companies is a key explanatory variable in our study we
describe in detail how these structures developed. Since 1989 the Czech Republic has un-
dergone overwhelming economic changes that have resulted in the quick introduction of a
modern market economy. At the beginning of the transition process, almost all productive
assets were state-owned, the separation of ownership and control did not exist, there was no
modern corporate law and financial markets, and corporate governance structures were only
about to start evolving.
The ownership structure of most Czech companies was set during the mass privatization of
medium and large enterprises in the first half of the 1990s.9 The majority of shares of these
companies were offered through the voucher scheme to the general public. All citizens 18 years
and over could buy, for a tiny nominal fee, a package of vouchers worth 1,000 points. With
these points they could bid for the shares on offer or they could place (part of) their points in
investment privatization funds, which could then bid for shares. After bidding was completed,
points were exchanged for shares and secondary market trading started at the Prague Stock
Exchange.10 A large number of investment privatization funds emerged on a voluntary basis.
Although funds were started by various sponsors (domestic and foreign banks, corporations,
or individuals), most funds were sponsored by domestic banks, with several banks starting
9 This section is based on Gupta et al. (2001) and Hanousek et al. (2004). The Czech privatization process
has been described in detail in Sˇvejnar and Singer (1994), Kotrba (1995), and Coffee (1996).
10 Before privatization, firms were transformed into joint stock companies. After incorporatization the firms’
current management had to submit privatization proposals and other individuals and institutions submitted
competing proposals. The privatization proposal was a business plan, which determined the equity share offered
in the voucher scheme to the public and the stake that remained in state hands in the form of temporary
or permanent holdings. The Ministry of Privatization picked and approved the winning proposal. If a direct
domestic or foreign investor had been identified who was willing to buy (part of) the firm, the required stake
in the firm was sold to the investor and the rest was offered in the voucher scheme. The level of managerial
and employee ownership was low. In the first wave, only a limited number of firms ended up with managerial
or employee ownership; in the second wave, more firms did, but the ownership stakes were low. Also, only very
limited restructuring happened prior to privatization.
7more than one fund. Funds ended up with about 70 % of all points. Bank-sponsored funds
acquired most of the points, with the ten largest bank-sponsored funds holding 67 % of all
points acquired by all funds (or about 44 % of all points initially bought by individuals).
Control of the largest privatization funds by majority state-owned banks was an unexpected
outcome for the government and had a major impact on the emerging corporate governance
structure in the middle of the 1990s.11
The privatization process was designed to find private owners of firms very quickly rather
than to look for optimal ownership structures. The decision-making of the Ministry of Pri-
vatization was rapid and rule-based, and the initial ownership structures emerging from pri-
vatization in 1994 can be considered exogenous with respect to future performance, capital
structures, and dividend policies of firms. The suboptimality of the first ownership structures
was confirmed by the rapid reallocation of shares across new owners in 1995-1996.12 The 1995-
1996 ownership changes were massive, unregulated, and frequently unobservable to outsiders.
Investors—especially privatization funds—engaged in direct swaps of large blocks of shares and
off-market share trading was common. The first ownership patterns that were consistent with
market economy principles emerged in 1996 and hence we chose this year as the beginning of
our analysis.
In 2003, the last year of our analysis, the Czech Republic was characterized by private
ownership, competitive product markets with unregulated prices, business law to a large extent
compliant with EU rules, a private banking sector, stock market, and an economy with links
to all major developed countries in the world. In May 2004 the country was integrated into the
EU.
3.2. Legal Framework
A new corporate law which reflected market economy principles was introduced in 1993. Since
lawmakers were well behind the economic activity, Czech law was incomplete and kept changing
literally every year.13 As a result, only very fundamental and robust ownership rights were
11 See Kocˇenda (1999) for a detailed description of how chains of ownership linked banks, investment
privatization funds, and industrial companies.
12 Cull et al. (2001) document how quickly post-privatization dispersed ownership structure became increas-
ingly concentrated in 1995-1996.
13 To illustrate the situation we describe the evolution of the income tax law in detail. The modern tax system
implemented from 1993 was completely novel for most of the citizenry as well as for the public administration.
8effectively enforced. High legal uncertainty and weak/slow law enforcement14 suggest that, in
the period we analyse, shareholders acted based on fundamental rights derived from ownership.
More subtle rights, e.g., rights protecting minority shareholders, were either nonexistent or very
poorly enforced. The ownership structures that were evolving in this environment reflected its
specific conditions, and large shareholding was quite naturally the most important control
device. Only highly concentrated owners are able to control managers effectively and, on
the other hand, because of the underdeveloped legal system and financial market, dispersed
ownership structures cannot enjoy benefits from greater market liquidity and better risk di-
versification.15 Overall, Czech corporate ownership structures are very different from those of
large publicly-traded firms from developed countries for which there exists a vast majority of
dividend empirical research.
3.3. Taxes
Taxation is one of the key determinants of corporate dividend policy and the different treatment
of various types of owners might explain varying dividend policies across ownership structures.16
We argue that this cannot be the case in the Czech Republic since the marginal tax rate on cash
dividends is the same for all types of shareholders and stock repurchases are not used at all.
Czech companies distribute dividends from after-tax profits. In the period of our analysis the
same dividend tax treatment applied to individuals and corporations. In the case of individuals,
income from dividends was taxed at the source separately from all other income using the flat
tax rate.17 The same treatment and rate applied to corporations (including financial institu-
tions). If the receiver was foreign the taxation of dividends was governed by the treaty between
the Czech Republic and the country of the receiver. These treaties prevented double taxation
Regulatory institutions and enforcement procedures developed gradually and the tax law was amended many
times. During 1993–2002, there were 43 amendments —approximately one modification every quarter. Not only
did the income tax law change substantially in character, it also became extensive. The first version of the law
contained fewer than 14 thousands words, whereas the one in 2002 was composed of nearly 57 thousand words.
Income tax law modifications were typically introduced to correct previous mistakes or to launch new policies,
though sometimes they emerged in reaction to lobbying. Even tax advisors complain that the law is too difficult
for them to follow, so that the ordinary public has little chance of grasping it.
14 To settle business disputes at court takes a lot of time: for example, lawsuits related to purchase agreements
took on average 452, 594, and 655 days to settle at court in 1998, 1999, and 2000 respectively (from statistics of
Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic).
15 See the survey by Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
16 See Allen et al. (2000) and Dhaliwal et al. (1998), for example.
17 In 1996-1998 the income dividend tax rate was 25 percent and from 1999 it was lowered to 15 percent.
9of dividends and existed with all major developed countries.18 Overall, tax considerations or
tax clientele effects cannot drive cross-sectional differences in dividend policies.
During 1996-2003 individuals were exempted from the capital gains tax if they held shares
for at least 6 months. On the other hand, corporations paid standard income tax on capital
gains; the corporate income tax rate was on average close to 30 percent and decreased grad-
ually. Pension, mutual, and investment funds had a preferential lower income tax rate. The
described taxation applied to capital gains realized by trading on the stock market, whereas
share repurchases were taxed in the same way as cash dividends independent of shareholder
type. As expected, we do not observe any share repurchases in the period of our analysis in the
Czech Republic.
4. Model
4.1. Ownership Structures
Our data allows us to track ownership in line with how Czech corporate law assigns control
rights to different ownership levels. We distinguish three ownership categories: majority own-
ership (more than 50 percent of shares)19, blocking minority ownership (more than 33.3 but
not more than 50 percent of shares), and legal minority ownership (at least 10 but not more
than 33.3 percent of shares).20 A majority owner has the right to select management and a
supervisory board, to decide whether the company distributes profits as dividends or reinvests
them, and to adopt almost all decisions at general shareholders’ meetings. Blocking minority
ownership gives the right to block some decisions at general shareholders’ meetings, mainly
those related to implementing major changes in business activities and changing the firm’s
18 Foreign owners in our sample are mainly from the EU and we have very few foreign owners incorporated in
offshore centres or low-income-tax countries.
19 We define the majority as holding more than 50 percent of shares or alternatively as holding more than
66.6 percent of shares.
20 Czech law does not require reporting of stakes of less than 10 percent. This does not restrict our analysis
since by having data on all owners with 10 percent and more we are able to estimate the effect of the most
relevant degrees of concentration and dispersion of ownership, ranging from a single owner having majority
ownership, to no single owner having legal minority ownership.
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capital structure.21 Finally, legal minority ownership can be considered a form of dispersed
ownership since its direct impact on business decisions is limited. On the other hand, the
corporate law entitles minority shareholders to call a general shareholders’ meeting to decide
on issues put on the meeting’s agenda by a minority shareholder.22 The ability to identify
owners according to these categories is a key to understanding corporate control in the Czech
Republic.
Based on these ownership levels we define the following concentration of ownership dummy
variables: Majority: The company is controlled by a single majority owner and the next largest
owner holds less than 10 percent of equity. Monitored majority: The majority owner is checked
by the presence of at least one significant minority owner (either blocking minority or legal
minority owner). Minority: The largest owner is only a blocking minority owner. Dispersed:
All shareholders have less than 10 percent of equity. In addition to concentration we are able
to identify types of owners: industrial firm, private individual, financial institution, and state.
Domicile of the owners is either Czech or foreign.23
4.2. Hypotheses
The motives of owners regarding the distribution of profits might vary across ownership stake
sizes. Majority owners may maximize shareholder value24 but they can also loot firms at
the expense of small shareholders.25 After controlling for capital structure and investment
opportunities, shareholder value maximization is associated with high dividend payouts. In
contrast, if the majority shareholders goal is to loot the firm, dividends are paid less often and
the target payout ratio is low.
21 A blocking minority owner may block a decision to change the articles of incorporation, liquidate the
company, issue priority or convertible bonds, issue equity, and increase or decrease equity capital in some other
way.
22 There were some cases in which minority shareholders obstructed a company’s operations by delaying
implementation of stronger shareholders’ decisions through lengthy court proceedings.
23 Type and domicile ownership structure is identified by the type and domicile of the single largest owner
(SLO).
24 Majority owners are expected to have access to more information about the firm and to be able to use more
efficient control mechanisms, most importantly a credible threat to dismiss management. In the context of the
Czech Republic it was documented that a firm’s value and profitability increase with ownership concentration.
See Hanousek et al. (2004); Claessens (1997); Claessens and Djankov (1999); or Claessens et al. (1997). This
contrasts with a finding by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) from the U.S., that no significant relationship between
ownership concentration and profit rates exists.
25 In the Czech Republic, this behaviour was extensively documented by Cull et al. (2001).
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These predictions are altered if the behaviour of the majority owner is monitored by the pres-
ence of a significant minority shareholder. Bargaining between majority and powerful minority
shareholder(s) induces the majority shareholder to pay dividends and not to misappropriate
profits.26 Hence we expect the monitored majority ownership structure to be associated with
a higher probability to pay dividends and with a higher target payout ratio relative to the
majority ownership structure. This pattern is difficult to explain by an alternative story. For
example, there is neither theory nor empirical evidence arguing that the size of ownership stake
is systematically linked to varying rates of time preference or different evaluation of investment
opportunities.
Firms with dispersed ownership structures might not suffer from misappropriating efforts of
the majority shareholder but dispersed owners might be weak in exercising their power against
management. On the other hand, since in dispersed ownership private benefits of control are
diluted among large number of shareholders, dividend payments are the only effective way
to disseminate profits and we expect these firms to have a high target payout ratio. We also
expect some dividend smoothing as free cash flow theory predicts for cases when asymmetric
information is high.
For many reasons we expect foreign owners to behave differently from Czech owners. Foreign
owners have better business, managerial, and corporate governance expertise than do Czech
owners. On the other hand, foreign owners are less familiar with local corporate, employment,
and other laws relevant to the operations of the firms they own, and they have to overcome
some additional, e.g., language or cultural, barriers. Therefore, agency conflicts and asymmetric
information between foreign owners and management/other domestic owners are different than
those between management and Czech owners. With better business know-how and knowledge
of technology, foreign investors can assess the profitability of firms27 and collect these profits
as dividends to prevent managers from misappropriating them.28 Due to ability to tap more
26 This result is documented by Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) for Germany. They show that dividend change
announcements provide new information about the conflict between a controlling owner and small outside share-
holders. ”Majority-controlled and unchecked” firms have the smallest target payout ratio, ”majority-controlled
and checked” firms have the largest target payout ratio, and minority-controlled firms lie in between. This implies
that minority shareholders with large stakes press successfully for dividends to be paid out, consistent with the
rent extraction hypothesis.
27 In the context of the Czech Republic, this argument is supported by Claessens and Djankov (1999) or
Hanousek et al. (2004), who show that foreign ownership is associated with improved performance.
28 Hines (1996) finds that U.S. corporations pay dividends out of their foreign profits at roughly three times
the rate they do out of their domestic profits. In a related paper, Desai et al. (2002) analyze dividend remittances
by foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms. The fact that parent firms are willing to incur tax penalties by
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developed capital markets foreign owners have easier access to external finance sources relative
to Czech owners. At the same time, we expect foreign owners to loot firms less than would Czech
owners since foreign owners have a bigger reputation at stake and are subject to more stringent
corporate governance (discipline imposed by more developed capital markets) in their home
countries. Also, foreign owners in our sample are predominantly industrial firms and financial
institutions, while we have many individuals and state institutions among Czech owners as
well. Overall, we expect firms with foreign ownership to have a higher target payout ratio and
to pay dividends more often relative to Czech owners and we provide key results for ownership
concentration separately for domestic and foreign owners.
In our sample majority owners from the financial sector are banks, bank-sponsored funds,
and insurance companies. Banks are usually described in the literature as good monitors, and
a combination of equity ownership and debt claims can reduce the shareholder-debtholder
conflict. In the Czech Republic, banks seem to serve an especially positive role in corporate
governance since the profitability and value of firms under bank ownership is high.29 Despite
increasing profitability, however, the effect on dividend policy has to be qualified by the fact that
paying high dividends could endanger banks’ loans. After controlling for this effect we expect
financial institutions with large shareholding to impose financial discipline and aim at high
dividend payout ratios. We expect no looting from banks as they are subject to much stricter
regulation and care more about their reputation than do industrial firms and individuals. We
also expect low dividend smoothing since information asymmetry in the case of bank ownership
is small.
Finally, the most common owners among state-controlled firms are municipalities and es-
pecially the National Property Fund.30 This suggests that dividends paid within this category
will be determined by the political process without aiming for a specific target payout ratio or
the level of dividend smoothing.
simultaneously investing funds while receiving dividends from foreign affiliates allows Desai et al. to argue that
payout policies are largely driven by the need to control managers of foreign affiliates by diverting funds.
29 See Claessens and Djankov (1999) and Claessens et al. (1997).
30 The National Property Fund manages shareholdings of the Czech state and sells these ownership stakes
over time by direct sales or auctions mainly to foreign investors.
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4.3. Estimation
Our specification of dividend payoffs builds upon the seminal model by Lintner (1956):31
Di,t = βi + αiτipii,t + (1− αi)Di,t−1 + εi,t, (1)
where Di,t is dividend per share company i pays in year t, pii,t denotes earnings per share
company i reports in year t, τi is the target payout ratio of company i, and i,t is the error
term. Parameters αi and 1 − αi correspond to the weight placed on current earnings and
lag dividends, respectively. In order to test our hypothesis that dividend payments vary with
ownership in our sample we augment specification (1) by ownership:
Di,t =
∑
j
[βj + αjτjpii,t + (1− αj)Di,t−1]OWN (j)i,t + ζi,t, (2)
where OWN (j)i,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company i belongs to ownership structure j
in year t and is zero otherwise. With respect to chosen ownership structure OWN (j)i,t, param-
eter τj of model (2) reflects the target payout ratio of ownership structure j, and parameters αj
and 1−αj correspond to the weight placed on current earnings and lag dividends, respectively.
Ownership structure as entered in (2) can be easily specified to account for majority/monitored
majority/minority/dispersed concentration level as well as its interaction with domicile and
type of owner.
A direct application of Lintner’s model suffers on several fronts in an emerging market
environment. First, we do not observe a majority of firms paying dividends (less than ten percent
of our sample) and hence a direct application of Lintner’s model leads to biased results due to
sample selection (see Heckman, 1979). Second, due to weak market supervision and regulation
enforcement we have to address the problem of missing financial data for firms that do not pay
dividends (in the case of the Czech Republic it reduces the original data panel to less than half
of a fully defined data point). Third, we study dividend payments shortly after privatization,
when ownership is potentially endogenous with respect to corporate performance (e.g., state
versus private, domestic versus foreign). Since profit influences dividends we therefore expect
a bi-directional link between ownership structure and the decision to pay dividends.
31 As noted by Benartzi et al. (1997): ”... the conclusion we draw from [our] analysis is that Lintner’s model
of dividends remains the best description of the dividend setting process available.”
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To address sample selection biases (missing data and a relatively low frequency of observed
dividends) and ownership endogeneity we model dividend payments as a two stage process. In
the first stage, firms decide whether a dividend will be paid or not, while in the second stage the
size of a dividend payment is decided. Technically, this approach is a Heckit regression, in which
we model separately the decision to pay dividends as a 0-1 variable (the first stage) and, in the
second stage, we estimate specification (2) for those firms paying dividends. Based on a thorough
discussion provided by Angrist and Krueger (2001) we use a linear probability model instead
of probit in the first stage. The linear probability model allows us to instrument ownership and
provides consistent estimates under standard assumptions, while probit regression with plugged
predicted values of ownership ”do not generate consistent estimates unless the nonlinear model
happens to be exactly right, a result which makes the dangers of misspecification high” (ibid).
Also, the linear probability model can be corrected for sample selection. We redo the first stage
using probit as a robustness check.
Besides its easy implementation, each estimation stage sheds light on the dividend decision
process: 1) linear probability regression (2SLS/IV) used as the first step provides a clear-cut
decision if the company pays dividends in a given year; 2) the ordinary least square method,
which we run on a subset of companies that decided to pay dividends, estimates what influences
the size of dividends in a Lintner-type specification augmented by various ownership structures.
Formally, the whole estimation logistics is described in the next section.
4.3.1. Two Stage Process for Dividend Payout
STAGE 1: We estimate the decision to pay dividends (0-1 variable) as a linear probability
regression model:
I[Di,t > 0] =
∑
j
p(j) ·OWN (j)i,t + CONTROLSi,t +
+EFFICIENCYi,t + t · TAX96−98 +
+d ·DIVi,t−1 + λ1 ·M1i,t + ηi,t, (3)
where OWN (j)i,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if company i belongs to ownership structure
j in year t and coefficient p(j) is the probability with which the ownership structure j pays
dividends. As controls (CONTROLSi,t) we use financial variables: total assets, total liabilities
to total assets, bank loans to total liabilities, cash holdings to total assets, and the growth rate
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of average sales in the industry the firm is part of, excluding the firm itself. After controlling for
capital structure and investment opportunities, the only variables that might drive the decision
to pay dividends from outside the shareholders’ perspective are efficiency measures: profit (or
total sales) to total assets and total sales to total labour costs. We include these variables in
model (3) as EFFICIENCYi,t. To account for a change in dividend taxation in the period of
our analysis we include a dummy variable TAX96−98 which is equal to 1 for the time period
with a higher dividend income tax rate (1996-1998). We also include dummy variable DIVi,t−1
that is equal to 1 if the firm paid dividends in the last year. We estimate model (3) using the
instrumental variable approach (the set of instruments for ownership variables is described and
discussed in detail in the next subsection).
Variable M1i,t in (3) stands for an inverse Mills ratio which we use to address the issue of
missing financial data. Mills ratio comes from the following probit regression (which we run as
a ”0 stage”) with missing financial data in our sample as a binary response:
I[MissF ] = f(const, TNSi, NSV Pi,MissF 91/93i,
APi, IPFi, IIi) + ϑi,t, (4)
where TNSi denotes the original total number of shares32 in the voucher privatization scheme
(in 1992); NSV Pi denotes the number of shares offered under the voucher privatization scheme;
MissF 91/93i stands for a set of 0/1 indicators of missing financial data (profit, sales, debt,
and the number of employees) prior to privatization (in 1991-1993); APi is the average price
for which the shares were sold in the voucher scheme; IPFi and IIi denote total holdings (in
percent) of the investment privatization funds after the voucher scheme (here we consider also
disaggregation to the five largest owners) and individual investors, respectively.
STAGE 2: We estimate the decision about the size of dividends paid on a subset of firms
paying dividends (i.e., Di,t > 0). The final specification we use is an extension of (2):
Di,t =
∑
j
[βj + αjτjpii,t + (1− αj)Di,t−1]OWN (j)i,t +
+CONTROLSi,t + λ2 ·M2i,t + νi,t. (5)
32 This is equal to the book value (or subscribed capital), since original shares were issued in the nominal
value of 1,000 CZK per share.
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We follow the established dividend literature (e.g., Fama and French, 2001), and use the
following control variables (CONTROLSi,t) to isolate corporate dividend policy from firms’
capital budgeting and borrowing decisions: Firm Size (Total assets, TAi,t; we expect a positive
relationship), Leverage (Total liabilities as a fraction of total assets, TLTAi,t; we expect a negative
relationship), Bank Power (Bank loans as a fraction of total liabilities, BLTL i,t; we expect a
negative relationship but this effect might interact with the aggregate leverage measure), Cash
Holdings (Cash as a fraction of total assets, CHTA i,t; we expect a positive relationship), and
Investment Opportunities (Growth rate between the current year and the following year of
average sales in the industry the firm is part of, excluding the firm itself, grSAi, t+1
t
; we expect
a negative relationship).33 We also include dummy variables for every year. Since less than ten
percent of firms in our sample pay dividends, we add the inverse Mills ratio, M2i,t, computed
from regression (3) to remove the sample selection bias.
While estimating (5) we test for ownership endogeneity by employing a Hausman-type test
for specification. In contrast to the first stage, ownership endogeneity is rejected in all second
stage specifications and hence we employ simple OLS regression.
4.3.2. Instruments Used for Endogeneity of Ownership in Dividend Payment Process
As instruments for ownership variables we use pre-privatization data coming from detailed
information on all proposed privatization projects that were submitted to the government before
privatization, and data related to voucher privatization (voucher privatization bids) available
at the Ministry of Finance. We have available all existing pre-privatization financial data,
together with the ownership structure specified in the winning privatization proposal. Despite
the fact that all our IVs are strictly pre-determined through time, we employ the Sargan test
of overidentifying restrictions and use only a subset of variables that do not interfere with the
formal test at the 10% significance level or stricter.34
33 Accounting variables: Earnings, total assets, total liabilities, bank loans, cash holdings, and sales come from
audited accounting statements as published by companies in their filings to the Prague Stock Exchange. We use
consolidated statements if available. All accounting statements are based on Czech accounting law and standards.
Cash is defined as the sum of two items in Czech accounting statements: ”Cash in hand” and ”Cash in transit”.
Sales are named as ”Sales of own production, services, and goods bought for resale” in the Czech accounting
statements. We include Bank Power to control for the possibility that a commercial bank is a shareholder and
a debtholder at the same time. This is quite common in our sample.
34 Some of the pre-determined variables do not pass the test of being strictly exogenous and hence we do not
use them in certain equations. For example, percentage of the firm’s shares to be sold to foreign owners (as
proposed in a winning project) typically does not pass the Sargan test.
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The full set of available instruments consists of a set of regional (REGi) and industrial
(INDi) dummies; basic accounting variables (sales, profit, and debt) from 1991-1993 (FINi);
TNSi, the total number of shares (the share of each company was set at the same nominal
value before large-scale privatization); the set of variables collected from the database of
privatization projects: NPi, which refers to the number of privatization projects submitted
to the government in 1991; V POWNi, which stands for the ownership structure proposed by
the government in 1991 in the winning privatization project—expressed in percentage intended
for certain ownership types (state, municipalities, foreign and domestic owners, intermediaries,
etc.); and the information coming from the voucher privatization scheme: APi, the average
price per share of a company in the voucher privatization scheme (this reflects the demand for
a particular firm in the privatization process). In addition, since we have a relatively unique
dataset on privatization outcomes, we also have information on the proportion of company
shares allocated to investment privatization funds IPFi (in the estimation we consider five
additional variables containing the holdings of the five largest investment funds) and individual
investors IIi, respectively, during large-scale privatization in 1992-1994.35
5. Data and Summary Statistics
Our analysis is based on data from 1996 to 2003 on the complete population of 1,664 medium
and large firms privatized in 1991-1994 and consequently traded on the Prague Stock Exchange,
which constituted most of the country’s economic activity in the late 1990s. Financial and
ownership data come from the private database ASPEKT.36 Data for the privatization period
come from the Ministry of Privatization of the Czech Republic. To estimate dividend equations
we use data from 1996-2003 (post-privatization market economy period). We use data from
1991-1994 (privatization period) as instrumental variables that allow us to control for the
endogeneity of ownership.
Companies with dispersed ownership seem to be big, not profitable, and dividend-paying.
The most effective firms are those with monitored majority ownership, but they seem to pay the
35 The effects of variables such as the firm’s total number of shares and shares allocated to the institutional
and individual investors may be nonlinear, so we use a Taylor series expansion of the third order to obtain a
specification that can take into account potential nonlinearities.
36 ASPEKT collets data mainly from the Prague Stock Exchange and the Czech Statistical Office. This
database is the Czech source for AMADEUS, a pan-European database containing financial statements data.
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lowest dividends among the concentration structures we consider. Majority controlled firms are
the smallest and seem to pay the largest dividends (see Table I). Czech controlled companies
seem to be on average smaller, more leveraged, and seem to pay lower dividends relative to
companies controlled by foreigners. Czech controlled firms are also not profitable (see Table
II). State-controlled companies are on average the largest and, surprisingly, seem to pay the
highest dividends among all ownership types; they are profitable and less levered than firms
from other control groups, but have relatively low sales relative to assets. Companies controlled
by individuals are on average small and have low profitability, yet still seem to pay some
dividends. Companies controlled by financial institutions seem to be just profitable, have the
highest leverage, and pay very low dividends. Companies controlled by industrial firms seem
to pay no dividends at all and to have the highest sales relative to staff costs (see Table III).
The total number of dividends paid is evenly spread over the whole period we analyse (see
Table IV). In the category Foreign and Financial we observe just a few dividend payments.
In the category Czech (or Foreign) and Industrial, SLOs seem to be well spread across many
industries. We observe very few dividends paid by firms in which SLO is an individual (Czech
or Foreign).
6. Results
Table V reports estimates from the stage one regression describing the decision to pay dividends
for the entire sample of 1,664 firms over the period 1996-2003, and Table VI reports estimates
from the stage two regression describing the conditional decision about the size of dividends
paid over the same period. All regressions contain the full set of ownership structure dummies;
the residual group of firms not assigned to any ownership category is denoted as ”Other”.
We present three specifications which differ based on how we cut the sample according to
ownership: domicile, concentration combined with domicile, and type.
The Czech largest owner has a positive but small effect on the probability to pay a dividend,
0.11 significant at the 1% level (column ”Domicile” in Table V). If the largest owner is foreign,
the probability to pay a dividend is positive and the effect is very large: 0.35 significant at
the 1% level. In line with this, the target dividend payout ratio (column ”Domicile” in Table
VI) for foreign-owned firms of 0.46 (significant at the 1% level) is substantially higher than
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Czech-owned firms at 0.12 (significant at the 5% level). These results are consistent with the
hypothesis that foreigners use dividends to distribute profits more often and aim at a higher
target payout ratio than Czechs (the difference in the target payout ratios is significant at the
1% level).
The main results are reported in the column ”Concentration” in Tables V and VI. The
probability that a firm with a Czech majority owner pays a dividend is 0.09 (significant at the
5% level). If the Czech majority owner is accompanied by a significant minority shareholder the
probability increases to 0.16 (significant at the 1% level). The same pattern holds for foreigners.
The probability that a firm with a foreign majority owner pays a dividend of 0.26 (significant at
the 1% level) is a lot lower than the same probability if the majority owner is accompanied by a
significant minority shareholder 0.58 (significant at the 1% level). The associated target payout
ratios for these ownership structures (”Concentration” column in Table VI) are as follows:
positive but not significant for the Czech majority ownership structure; 0.82 (significant at
the 1% level) for the Czech monitored majority ownership structure; 0.61 (significant at the
1% level) for the foreign majority ownership structure; and 0.86 (significant at the 1% level)
for the foreign monitored majority ownership structure. The difference in target payout ratios
for Czech majority controlled and Czech monitored majority controlled firms is significant at
the 10% level, but the same test of difference of target payout ratios for firms with a foreign
largest owner is significant only at the 34% level. This set of results supports our hypothesis
that significant minority shareholders limit rent extraction by increasing the probability that
a dividend is paid and increasing the target payout ratio. This holds both for Czech as well as
for foreign largest owners after controlling for firm size, performance, investment opportunities,
leverage, and bank influence on the firm. Rent extraction and dilution of minority shareholders
seems to be associated predominantly with Czech owners.
Ownership by financial institutions (column ”Type” in Table VI) is associated with a high
target payout ratio of 0.54 (significant at the 1% level) and no dividend smoothing since the
weight put on current earnings is 1.0 (significant at the 1% level). In line with predictions of
the free cash flow theory this result confirms that financial institutions act as sophisticated
monitors that do not rely on dividend smoothing as a controlling mechanism and collect about
half of the profits as dividends every year. If the largest owner is a financial institution, the effect
on the probability to pay dividends depends on the domicile (column ”Type” in Table V). A
Czech financial institution has a positive effect on the probability to pay dividends (coefficient
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0.24 significant at the 1% level). In contrast, the coefficient associated with a foreign financial
institution is 1.22 (significant at the 1% level).
If the largest owner is an industrial firm the target payout ratio is 0.56 (significant at the
1% level) and we observe significant dividend smoothing; the weight associated with current
earnings is 0.47 (significant at the 1% level). Industrial owners smooth dividends considerably
more than do owners from the financial sector; the difference in weights placed on current
earnings is significant at the 1% level. Ownership by private individuals has no effect on the
probability to pay dividends (coefficient 0.06 is not significant) and the target payout ratio
is not significantly different from zero either. This seems to suggest that private individuals
as largest owners do not pay dividends and extract rents instead. The state as an owner is
associated with a positive probability that dividends are paid, 0.26 (significant at the 1% level)
but decisions about dividend payments do not seem to be consistent with Lintner’s model,
as neither the weight coefficient nor the target payout ratio coefficient are significant. We
believe this is because dividends are paid according to the fiscal needs of the government or
municipalities with no aim to establish a target payout ratio.
In Tables V and VI, the ownership category ”Dispersed or unknown” contains firms of two
types that we cannot distinguish: Firms with dispersed ownership without legal obligation
to disclose their owners, and firms that do not report their ownership structure. This makes
interpretation of the results difficult since, e.g., firms with both Czech and foreign ownership
might have reasons not to disclose their ownership structures. For the ”Dispersed or unknown”
ownership structure the probability to pay dividends is on average 0.18 (significant at the 1%
level in all specifications) and the target payout ratio is large, on average 0.94 across all three
specifications (significant at the 1% level). This suggests that dividends are used to distribute
profits if there is no large shareholder with a strong incentive to extract rents or to dilute, but
our data do not allow us to draw any strong conclusion.
The coefficients in front of the control variables have similar signs as found in the previous
literature in both regressions: Firm size has a positive and significant effect on the probability
to pay dividends and seems to increase the target payout ratio. Leverage and the strength of
bank presence has a small negative effect on the probability of paying dividends and a strong
negative effect on the size of dividends. Investment opportunities on the industry level have
a negative effect both on the probability to pay dividends and on the target payout ratio.
The large positive effect of dividend history (on average 0.59, significant at the 1% level in
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all specifications) supports the use of Lintner’s model. The decrease of dividend income tax
positively contributes to the probability to pay dividends. Finally, earnings-per-total assets and
sales to staff costs measures of efficiency have a positive and weakly significant effect on the
probability to pay dividends.
7. Robustness Checks
7.1. Variables Definition
The use of different earnings measures in Equations (3) and (5): operating profit before income
tax, profit including/excluding extraordinary items, or after tax profit has no impact on results
reported in Tables V and VI.
We use total sales instead of total assets as a measure of a firm’s size, bank loans as a
fraction of total assets instead of total liabilities as a fraction of total assets as an alternative
measure of leverage, and cash holdings including or excluding marketable securities37. These
changes in control variables have again no impact on our results in Tables V and VI.
7.2. Investment Opportunities
As alternative measures of investment opportunities we use the growth rate of total assets,
earnings, or value added in the industry the firm is part of (excluding the firm itself). We tried
growth rates both between the current year and the following year, and between the previous
year and the current year. In all these specifications the results are unchanged.
Finally, we use the firm-level growth rate of total assets (or total sales) in combination with
industry dummy variables instead of various industry-level growth rates. Tables VII and VIII
have the same structure as Tables V and VI, respectively, and report results from these regres-
sions. The coefficients in front of ownership variables remain to a large extent unchanged and
confirm corporate dividend behaviour found in the main specification: Firms with a dominant
majority owner pay dividends less often and their target payout ratio is small. In contrast,
37 We add the item ”Cash and investments” to the cash variable used in the main specification. In Czech
accounting statements this item includes short-term investments in very liquid financial assets.
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firms with a majority owner and at least one strong minority owner pay dividends more often
and the target payout ratio is large.
7.3. Decision to Pay Dividends
We estimate the stage 1 decision to pay dividends using a probit regression:
I[Di,t > 0] = g
(
const,OWN (j)i,t , CONTROLSi,t,
EFFICIENCYi,t, TAX96−98, DIVi,t−1) + ξi,t, (6)
where variables on the right hand side are the same as in (3). To account for the endogeneity
of ownership we estimate predictions of ownership variables OWN (j)i,t from a reduced form
equation and plug them into the decision to pay dividends equation (6). Since Pr( ̂ownership =
j) converge to Pr(ownership = j), by inserting the predicted values of the ownership variables
into (6) we obtain consistent estimates of average partial effects. Formally, we run the following
probit regression:
OWN(j)i,t = h (INSTRUMETSi,t) + ςi,t, (7)
with the same instrumental variables as in the main specification (3). Predicting ownership
dummy variables is difficult since in some ownership groups we have a small number of obser-
vations and thus to receive feasible estimates we have to broaden the ownership categories. We
employ this estimation approach as it is used in the literature and we are aware of all problems
described in Blundel and Smith (1994). Also, correcting for sample selection bias—important
in our sample—is not possible in this case.
Table IX has the same structure as Table V and reports results from regression (6). The
results are broadly consistent with the one from the linear probability model: in the probit
case Czech majority owners decrease the probability of paying dividends (marginal effect -0.03,
significant at the 1% level) whereas foreign majority owners increase the probability of paying
dividends (marginal effect 0.02, significant at the 10% level). The results for concentration are
not significant. This is because the lack of observations prevents us from combining concentra-
tion with domicile and therefore the effects of Czech and foreign ownership are mixed. Financial
institutions have a positive effect on the probability of dividend payments (consistent with the
23
results in Table V) while industrial firms have a negative effect. Results for individuals and the
state are not significant in this specification.
8. Conclusion
The key agency costs in firms with concentrated ownership shift from the traditional owner-
manager conflict to the dominant shareholder’s incentive to consume private benefits at the
expense of other minority shareholders. The question whether this rent extraction takes place,
how significant is it, and whether minority shareholders are able to monitor large shareholders
in order to preclude such consumption is answered in this paper.
We find that corporate dividend policy in an emerging market economy depends on concen-
tration and domicile of ownership. Firms with a dominant majority owner pay dividends less
often and their target payout ratio is small. In contrast, firms with a majority owner and at
least one strong minority owner pay dividends more often and the target payout ratio is large.
We interpret these results as evidence that dominant owners extract rents from firms and that
strong minority shareholders can prevent this behaviour. This dividend pattern holds both for
domestic and foreign largest owners though domestic owners do enjoy significantly higher rents.
The results are robust to alternative definition of key ownership variables, the way we measure
firms’ investment opportunities and efficiency, and use of an alternative estimation technique.
Our analysis of expropriation from the perspective of dividends does provide quantitative
evidence on the expropriation that takes place within Czech companies. Expropriation by
corporate insiders is not simply a matter of redistribution amongst shareholders only. It is
damaging more generally as corporate insiders might choose to invest in projects with low or
negative returns just because they create opportunities for expropriation. Investment decisions
are hence distorted and corporate growth is slower than it could be. Such inefficient investment
behaviour, if undertaken by a large number of firms, has adverse effects on the whole economy.
This is of an exceptional interest in countries like Czech Republic which struggle to catch
up with developed economies of Western Europe. Each dollar available for investing should
be allocated to growth opportunities with the highest returns and the investment decision
should not be based on what projects make expropriation easy. To address these problems
regulators should, first, strengthen the rights of minority shareholders to enable them to limit
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expropriation. Second, and more importantly, regulators should support the development of
sound and transparent financial markets prevalent in Western Europe as they seem, based on
extensive both anecdotal and research evidence, to police dominant owners most effectively. We
expect similar results to hold in countries with a comparable institutional framework, i.e., where
fundamental ownership rights are honoured but capital markets and corporate governance
mechanisms are underdeveloped.
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10. Appendix
Table I. Ownership concentration: descriptive statistics
The sample consists of 1,664 firms over the period 1996-2003. These firms are all medium and large companies
privatized in the Czech Republic by 1994. Ownership concentration structures are: Majority: The company is
controlled by a single majority owner (more than 50 percent of equity) and the next largest owner holds less
than 10 percent of equity. Monitored majority: The majority owner (more than 50 percent of equity) is checked
by the presence of at least one significant minority owner (either blocking minority, more than 33.3 of equity, or
legal minority owner, more than 10 percent of equity). Dispersed: All shareholders have less than 10 percent of
equity. Column ”Obs” shows the number of firm-years observations in a given category. Variables Profit/Total
assets, Liabilities/Total assets, Sales/Total assets, and Sales/Staff costs are weighted by Total assets. Only
firms with liabilities less than twice the size of total assets are included.
Ownership concentration Mean Std Obs
Total assets (mil. CZK) Majority 1.009 7.935 1,775
Monitored majority 1.431 8.167 2,235
Dispersed 1.920 9.037 1,866
Dividend / Profit Majority 0.040 0.681 1,775
Monitored majority 0.026 0.291 2,235
Dispersed 0.032 0.158 1,866
Profit / Total assets Majority 0.019 0.156 1,719
Monitored majority 0.042 0.242 2,204
Dispersed -0.005 0.120 1,853
Liabilities / Total assets Majority 0.398 0.283 1,719
Monitored majority 0.626 0.358 2,204
Dispersed 0.347 0.238 1,853
Sales / Total assets Majority 0.935 0.781 1,719
Monitored majority 1.441 0.874 2,204
Dispersed 0.799 0.580 1,853
Sales / Staff costs Majority 8.003 37.294 1,719
Monitored majority 15.915 38.511 2,204
Dispersed 6.310 7.718 1,853
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Table II. Domicile of ownership: descriptive statistics
The sample consists of 1,664 firms over the period 1996-2003. These firms are all medium and large companies
privatized in the Czech Republic by 1994. Domicile of ownership is classified according to the single largest
owner. Column ”Obs” shows the number of firm-years observations in a given category. Variables Profit/Total
assets, Liabilities/Total assets, Sales/Total assets, and Sales/Staff costs are weighted by Total assets. Only
firms with liabilities less than twice the size of total assets are included.
Domicile of ownership Mean Std Obs
Total assets (mil. CZK) Czech 1.044 7.399 5,786
Foreign 1.803 7.571 844
Dividend / Profit Czech 0.012 1.252 5,786
Foreign 0.068 0.273 844
Profit / Total assets Czech -0.009 0.286 5,688
Foreign 0.051 0.153 827
Liabilities / Total assets Czech 0.479 0.350 5,688
Foreign 0.434 0.338 827
Sales / Total assets Czech 1.103 0.903 5,688
Foreign 0.954 0.654 827
Sales / Staff costs Czech 11.420 46.776 5,688
Foreign 9.624 19.125 827
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Table III. Type of ownership: descriptive statistics
The sample consists of 1,664 firms over the period 1996-2003. These firms are all medium and large companies
privatized in the Czech Republic by 1994. Type of ownership is classified according to the single largest owner.
State ownership includes ownership by municipalities and various state agencies. Owners from the financial
sector are predominantly banks, bank-sponsored funds, and insurance companies. Column ”Obs” shows the
number of firm-years observations in a given category. Variables Profit/Total assets, Liabilities/Total assets,
Sales/Total assets, and Sales/Staff costs are weighted by Total assets. Only firms with liabilities less than twice
the size of total assets are included.
Type of ownership Mean Std Obs
Total assets (mil. CZK) State 6.998 25.537 435
Individual 0.222 0.441 1,035
Industrial 0.838 3.692 4,656
Financial 0.764 2.241 498
Dividend / Profit State 0.129 1.387 435
Individual 0.052 1.318 1,035
Industrial 0.002 1.181 4,656
Financial 0.011 0.106 498
Profit / Total assets State 0.029 0.073 429
Individual 0.009 0.103 1,021
Industrial 0.038 0.107 4,563
Financial 0.002 0.099 496
Liabilities / Total assets State 0.389 0.195 429
Individual 0.459 0.227 1,021
Industrial 0.467 0.256 4,563
Financial 0.490 0.247 496
Sales / Total assets State 0.427 0.327 429
Individual 0.875 0.634 1,021
Industrial 0.791 0.588 4,563
Financial 0.724 0.489 496
Sales / Staff costs State 9.048 5.876 429
Individual 8.238 18.766 1,021
Industrial 10.857 28.553 4,563
Financial 6.616 5.541 496
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Table IV. Number of dividend-paying companies
The sample consists of 1,664 firms over the period 1996-2003. These firms are all medium and large companies
privatized in the Czech Republic by 1994. Column ”Obs” shows the number of positive dividend payments
observed in a given year. Only firms with liabilities less than twice the size of total assets are included.
Year Obs
1996 71
1997 86
1998 75
1999 61
2000 63
2001 58
2002 54
Total 468
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Table V. STAGE 1: Decision to pay dividends
Dependent variable: 0/1 indicating whether dividends are paid or not.
The sample consists of 1,664 firms over the period 1996-2003 for a total of 5,437 firm-years observations. These
firms are all medium and large companies privatized in the Czech Republic by 1994. The dependent variable in
all regressions is zero-one variable; one if a firm pays a dividend in a given year and zero otherwise. All estimates
are 2SLS/IV estimates with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors reported in parentheses under
the coefficient estimates. We use data from 1991-1994 (privatization period) as instrumental variables that allow
us to control for the endogeneity of ownership. The last but one row reports the results of the Sargan test of the
overidentifying restrictions. All regression equations contain the full set of ownership structure dummies and the
residual group of firms not assigned to any category is denoted as ”Other”. Detailed description of ownership
variables and control together with instrumental variables is in section 4.1, 4.3.1, and 4.3.2, respectively.
*, **, *** denotes a significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Ownership Domicile Concentration Type
Czech Foreign Czech Foreign Czech Foreign
All sample 0.110*** 0.352***
(0.033) (0.051)
Majority 0.095** 0.261***
(0.050) (0.075)
Monitored majority 0.161*** 0.578***
(0.048) (0.211)
Minority 0.064 0.427***
(0.044) (0.144)
Financial 0.236*** 1.223***
(0.070) (0.415)
Industrial 0.145***
(0.038)
Individual 0.063
(0.065)
State 0.257***
(0.048)
Dispersed or unknown 0.172*** 0.175*** 0.185***
(0.036) (0.04) (0.04)
Other 0.119*** 0.061
(0.037) (1.091)
Total assets 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total liabilities / Total assets -0.009 -0.006 0.007
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Bank loans / Total liabilities -0.006 -0.015 -0.029
(0.025) (0.026) (0.031)
Cash / Total assets -0.024 -0.083 -0.041
(0.105) (0.124) (0.124)
Investment opportunities (industry-level) -0.040* -0.051** -0.044*
(0.022) (0.024) (0.025)
Dividend 1 year before dummy 0.592*** 0.590*** 0.585***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Tax dummy (1996-1998) -0.014 -0.019* -0.027***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Earnings / Total assets 0.042* 0.045* 0.069**
(0.022) (0.026) (0.033)
Sales / Total assets -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Sales / Staff costs 0.102* 0.107* 0.111
(0.062) (0.066) (0.071)
Mills (Sample selection) -0.083*** -0.077*** -0.091***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.028)
Number of observations 5,437 5,437 5,437
Test overidentif. (p-value) 1.16 (.160) 1.05 (.366) 1.10 (.268)
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.39 0.37
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Table VI. STAGE 2: Conditional dividends payments
Dependent variable: Dividend paid in year t by company i.
The sample consists of 1,664 firms over the period 1996-2003 for a total of 468 firm-years observations
with a positive dividend payment. These firms are all medium and large companies privatized in the
Czech Republic by 1994. The dependent variable in all regressions is the dividend paid in year t by
company i. Coefficient α represents dividend smoothing and τ is a target dividend payout ratio in the
Lintner-type model. All estimates are OLS estimates with standard errors reported in parentheses under
the coefficient estimates. For each specifications we perform Hausman endogeneity test and according
to results we treat ownership as exogenous. All regression equations contain the full set of ownership
structure dummies and the residual group of firms not assigned to any category is denoted as ”Other”.
Detailed description of ownership variables and control variables is in section 4.1 and 4.3.1, respectively.
*, **, *** denotes a significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Ownership Domicile Concentration Type
α τ α τ α τ
Czech 0.490*** 0.125**
(0.027) (0.062)
Foreign 0.600*** 0.464***
(0.105) (0.093)
Czech majority 0.473*** 0.134
(0.031) (0.319)
Czech monitored majority 0.451*** 0.823***
(0.139) (0.236)
Czech minority 0.801 *** 0.138*
(0.075) (0.085)
Foreign majority 0.715*** 0.607***
(0.106) (0.065)
Foreign monitored majority 0.853** 0.858***
(0.380) (0.258)
Financial 0.998*** 0.540***
(0.101) (0.083)
Industrial 0.471*** 0.563***
(0.029) (0.089)
Individual 0.112 -0.081
(1.570) (1.713)
State 0.128 0.498
(0.592) (2.279)
Dispersed or Unknown 0.748*** 0.966*** 0.711*** 0.925*** 0.704*** 0.925***
(0.127) (0.121) (0.12) (0.11) (0.124) (0.117)
Other -0.303 -0.201
(0.408) (0.319)
Total assets 0.392 0.456 0.438
(0.455) (0.042) (0.454)
Total liabilities / Total assets -89.1** -76.8** -95.8**
(44.9) (40.6) (44.8)
Bank loans / Total liabilities 9.30 8.97 7.97
(15.90) (14.88) (15.74)
Cash / Total assets -1,651 -1,603 -2,113
(1,388) (1,497) (1,352)
Investment opportunities (industry-level) -29.4 -70.9 -36.1
(61.8) (57.4) (61.0)
Year dummies YES YES YES
Mills (Sample selection) 35.8*** 48.7*** 48.5***
(12.3) (11.9) (12.7)
Number of observations 468 468 468
Hausman test (p-value) 0.66 0.26 0.71
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.66 0.61
36
Table VII. STAGE 1: Decision to pay dividends, firm-level growth rates and industry dummies
Dependent variable: 0/1 indicating whether dividends are paid or not.
The sample consists of 1,664 firms over the period 1996-2003 for a total of 6,188 firm-years observations. These
firms are all medium and large companies privatized in the Czech Republic by 1994. The dependent variable in
all regressions is zero-one variable; one if a firm pays a dividend in a given year and zero otherwise. All estimates
are 2SLS/IV estimates with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors reported in parentheses under
the coefficient estimates. We use data from 1991-1994 (privatization period) as instrumental variables that allow
us to control for the endogeneity of ownership. The last but one row reports the results of the Sargan test of the
overidentifying restrictions. All regression equations contain the full set of ownership structure dummies and the
residual group of firms not assigned to any category is denoted as ”Other”. Detailed description of ownership
variables and control together with instrumental variables is in section 4.1, 4.3.1, and 4.3.2, respectively. Alterna-
tive measures of growth opportunities: firm-level growth rates and industry dummies are described in section 7.2.
*, **, *** denotes a significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Ownership Domicile Concentration Type
Czech Foreign Czech Foreign Czech Foreign
All sample 0.120*** 0.386***
(0.028) (0.057)
Majority 0.100** 0.357***
(0.047) (0.086)
Monitored majority 0.224*** 0.454***
(0.048) (0.176)
Minority 0.062 0.401***
(0.044) (0.153)
Financial 0.290*** 0.845***
(0.069) (0.339)
Industrial 0.157***
(0.028)
Individual 0.013
(0.045)
State 0.265***
(0.044)
Dispersed or unknown 0.181*** 0.188*** 0.187***
(0.041) (0.04) (0.04)
Other 0.120*** 0.480
(0.035) (0.863)
Total assets 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total liabilities / Total assets 0.003 0.003 0.008*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Bank loans / Total liabilities 0.015 0.003 -0.013
(0.210) (0.022) (0.025)
Cash / Total assets -0.002 -0.066 -0.017
(0.080) (0.113) (0.072)
Investment opportunities (firm-level) 0.004 0.474 0.315
(0.200) (0.313) (0.403)
Dividend 1 year before dummy 0.515*** 0.510*** 0.517***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Tax dummy (1996-1998) -0.012 -0.015 -0.030***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Earnings / Total assets 0.003 0.004 0.008*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Sales / Total assets -0.005 -0.005 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Sales / Staff costs 0.054* 0.060* 0.054
(0.031) (0.033) (0.034)
Industry dummies YES YES YES
Mills (Sample selection) 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.024***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Number of observations 6,188 6,188 6,188
Test overidentif. (p-value) 1.20 (.139) 0.94 (.598) 1.24 (.104)
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.32 0.37
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Table VIII. STAGE 2: Conditional dividends payments, firm-level growth rates and industry dummies
Dependent variable: Dividend paid in year t by company i.
The sample consists of 1,664 firms over the period 1996-2003 for a total of 467 firm-years observations
with a positive dividend payment. These firms are all medium and large companies privatized in the
Czech Republic by 1994. The dependent variable in all regressions is the dividend paid in year t by
company i. Coefficient α represents dividend smoothing and τ is a target dividend payout ratio in the
Lintner-type model. All estimates are OLS estimates with standard errors reported in parentheses under
the coefficient estimates. For each specifications we perform Hausman endogeneity test and according to
results we treat ownership as exogenous. All regression equations contain the full set of ownership structure
dummies and the residual group of firms not assigned to any category is denoted as ”Other”. Detailed
description of ownership variables and control variables is in section 4.1 and 4.3.1, respectively. Alternative
measures of growth opportunities: firm-level growth rates and industry dummies are described in section 7.2.
*, **, *** denotes a significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Ownership Domicile Concentration Type
α τ α τ α τ
Czech 0.486*** 0.044
(0.028) (0.072)
Foreign 0.588*** 0.366***
(0.105) (0.112)
Czech majority 0.442*** -0.232
(0.032) (0.369)
Czech monitored majority 0.481*** 0.776***
(0.153) (0.226)
Czech minority 0.810*** 0.127
(0.076) (0.088)
Foreign majority 0.682*** 0.532***
(0.105) (0.079)
Foreign monitored majority 0.890** 0.858***
(0.383) (0.248)
Financial 1.016*** 0.538***
(0.100) (0.084)
Industrial 0.453*** 0.470***
(0.030) (0.109)
Individual -0.227 0.144
(1.627) (0.930)
State -0.251 -0.001
(0.610) (0.168)
Dispersed or unknown 0.780*** 0.908*** 0.723*** 0.879*** 0.705*** 0.902***
(0.134) (0.118) (0.130) (0.110) (0.131) (0.124)
Other -0.443 0.002
(0.438) (0.085)
Total assets 0.426 0.553 0.517
(0.475) (0.442) (0.468)
Total liabilities / Total assets -110.3** -109.5*** -121.8***
(47.7) (42.5) (47.4)
Bank loans / Total liabilities 8.05 10.13 8.08
(16.54) (15.62) (16.31)
Cash / Total assets -1,751 -1,863 -2,152*
(1,368) (1,501) (1,325)
Investment opportunities (firm-level) 111.9** 165.9*** 156.7***
(46.8) (45.1) (46.9)
Year dummies YES YES YES
Industry dummies YES YES YES
Mills (Sample selection) 37.1*** 49.4*** 50.9***
(12.4) (12.2) (12.8)
Number of observations 467 467 467
Hausman test (p-value) 0.97 0.98 0.32
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.66 0.63
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Table IX. STAGE 1: Decision to pay dividends, PROBIT
Dependent variable: 0/1 indicating whether dividends are paid or not.
The sample consists of 1,664 firms over the period 1996-2003 for a total of 5,437 firm-years observations.
These firms are all medium and large companies privatized in the Czech Republic by 1994. The dependent
variable in all regressions is zero-one variable; one if a firm pays a dividend in a given year and zero
otherwise. All estimates are probit estimates. Ownership variables are predicted by estimating probit
regressions using data from 1991-1994 (privatization period) to control for the endogeneity of ownership
as described in section 7.3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates.
Ceteris paribus marginal effects are reported in the column ”Marginal”. Detailed description of ownership
variables and control together with instrumental variables is in section 4.1, 4.3.1, and 4.3.2, respectively.
*, **, *** denotes a significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Ownership Domicile Concentration Type
Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
Czech -0.32*** -0.03
(0.10)
Foreign 0.28* 0.02
(0.17)
Majority -0.11 -0.01
(0.33)
Monitored majority -0.65 -0.05
(0.59)
Minority -0.23** -0.02
(0.12)
Financial 0.37* 0.03
(0.21)
Industrial -0.23*** -0.02
(0.07)
Individual -0.65 -0.05
(0.46)
State -0.06 -0.01
(0.18)
Dispersed or unknown 0.33*** 0.03
(0.10)
Constant -1.57*** -0.13 -1.84*** -0.15 -1.73*** -0.14
(0.13) (0.11) (0.11)
Total assets 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total liabilities / Total assets -0.05 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.05 0.00
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Bank loans / Total liabilities -0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Cash / Total assets -9.68* -0.79 -9.09 -0.74 -10.35* -0.85
(5.97) (5.85) (5.89)
Investment opportunities -0.64** -0.05 -0.65** -0.05 -0.65** -0.05
(0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Dividend 1 year before dummy 2.15*** 0.17 2.14*** 0.17 2.16*** 0.18
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Tax dummy (1996-1998) -0.22*** -0.02 -0.23*** -0.02 -0.22*** -0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Earnings / Total assets 3.85*** 0.31 3.97*** 0.32 4.07*** 0.33
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41)
Sales / Total assets -0.11* -0.01 -0.11* -0.01 -0.12** -0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Sales / Staff costs 0.68 0.06 0.67 0.05 0.64 0.05
(0.51) (0.51) (0.50)
Number of observations 5,437 5,437 5,437
Log likelihood -838.48 -839.36 -840.27
Standardized R2 0.31 0.31 0.31
